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1 
MOSTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 
THE CASE AGAINST PRECEDENT REVISITED 
Gary Lawson† 
In the American legal system, it is commonplace for actors to give 
varying degrees of legal weight to the decisions of prior actors.  The 
generic name for this pervasive and familiar practice is the doctrine of 
precedent.1  Although all legal actors must consider the extent to 
which they ought to follow the prior decisions of others,2 the concept 
of precedent is associated most closely with the decision-making 
processes of judges.  A court facing a legal problem must consider the 
weight, if any, that it will give to, inter alia, (1) prior executive or 
legislative decisions,3 (2) decisions by courts situated above the 
 
 † Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to the Abraham and Lillian 
Benton Fund for support.  I would like to thank the staff at the Ave Maria Law Review for a 
sterling edit—including, but not limited to, finding sources for some of my more colorful 
references. 
 1. The literature on precedent is too voluminous to make a string citation useful.  For 
helpful and classic introductions to the topic, see generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by 
Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989) and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 
(1987). 
 2. The President, for instance, must decide the extent to which his or her constitutional 
deliberations should be affected by decisions of courts, legislatures, or prior Presidents.  For 
differing views on the President’s obligations, compare Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to 
Know About Presidents I Learned from Dr. Seuss, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381 (2001) 
[hereinafter Lawson, Everything I Need to Know] (arguing that the President should not 
generally give weight to prior decisions simply because they are prior decisions), with David A. 
Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (1993) 
(suggesting that the President should generally give prior Supreme Court decisions the same 
weight that the Supreme Court gives them).  And on a more mundane level, under governing 
law, officials in federal administrative agencies who depart from the precedents of their 
predecessors have an obligation to explain why they are doing so.  LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. 
NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 3. The practice of giving weight to executive or legislative actors often goes under the 
heading of “deference,” but it is actually a form of precedent that is conceptually 
indistinguishable from deference to prior judicial actors.  Judicial deference to executive and 
legislative precedent is commonplace in many contexts.  Federal courts routinely give weight to 
prior decisions of federal administrative agencies on issues of both fact and law.  See, e.g., 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (instructing courts to overturn “findings . . . found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” in informal agency 
proceedings); id. § 706(2)(E) (providing for reversal of agency factual determinations that are 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235786
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deciding court in the judicial hierarchy (vertical precedent),4 (3) 
decisions by courts situated at the same level as the deciding court in 
the judicial hierarchy (horizontal precedent),5 and (4) decisions by 
courts or legal actors from foreign legal systems.6  The consensus view 
in the modern American legal culture is that some form of precedent 
is “part of our understanding of what law is.”7 
In this short Article, I want to (re)examine one specific but 
important aspect of the doctrine of precedent: the weight that the 
Constitution requires or permits the United States Supreme Court to 
give to prior United States Supreme Court decisions in constitutional 
cases.  Thus, I am putting aside for now all questions of vertical 
precedent, all issues of horizontal precedent at the district court and 
court of appeals levels (and across departments within the national 
government), all issues of precedent in cases involving statutory 
interpretation, and all problems unique to common law cases.  The 
question remaining after these other issues are tabled is, how much 
weight is the Supreme Court obliged or permitted to give to its own 
 
“unsupported by substantial evidence” in formal proceedings); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (prescribing deference to a range of agency 
interpretations of statutes); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) 
(prescribing deference to a range of agency interpretations of regulations).  Federal courts also 
often defer to executive interpretations of treaties.  See O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 
33–35 (1986).  But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793–98 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(rejecting the government’s construction of treaties without mentioning the doctrine of 
deference).  And a venerable tradition holds that courts should give great weight to prior 
legislative and executive judgments about the constitutionality of legislation.  See SYLVIA 
SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 13–44 (1990); James B. Thayer, 
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 
(1893); cf. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1274–79 (1996) (criticizing this tradition). 
 4. For a good introduction to this problem, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior 
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). 
 5. If there is a default meaning for the general term “precedent,” this would likely be the 
one.  Even in this context, however, the precise meaning of “precedent” varies with the level of 
court that one is discussing.  Federal district courts generally do not give much weight to 
decisions of their fellow district courts.  Panels of federal courts of appeals, by contrast, 
generally treat decisions of prior panels within the same circuit as binding until altered by en 
banc proceedings.  And the Supreme Court generally gives its prior decisions something 
between binding force and benign neglect. 
 6. For an illuminating treatment of the role that foreign precedents have played and 
should play in American law, see Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The 
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
 7. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 748 (1988). 
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prior interpretations of the Constitution?8  Conventional wisdom, in 
keeping with the view that precedent is an essential part of our 
understanding of law itself, holds that the Court is permitted, though 
not necessarily obliged, to give considerable, though not necessarily 
conclusive, weight to its prior decisions.  The standard formulation is 
that the Court should not reject prior decisions, even when a current 
majority believes them on balance to be mistaken, without some 
“special justification”9 beyond the mere belief of error.10 
Nearly fifteen years ago, I suggested that the Court, if it wants to 
conform to the Constitution, should never choose precedent over 
direct examination of constitutional meaning.11  After considering the 
issue further, and digesting a decade and a half of criticism of my 
argument by the legal academy,12 I want to change my conclusion 
 
 8. At all times in this Article, when I discuss what courts are obliged or permitted to do, I 
mean obliged or permitted by the Constitution.  I do not mean to prescribe, as a matter of 
political morality, how public officials—whose actions determine who gets shot by soldiers, 
federal marshals, or police—should do their jobs.  One of my principal academic bugaboos is the 
persistent conflation of questions of legal interpretation with questions of political morality.  It is 
one thing to establish the meaning of the Constitution.  It is quite another thing to say that the 
meaning of the Constitution should, as a normative matter, guide conduct.  All manner of 
mischief comes from confusing the two distinct enterprises.  See Gary Lawson, On Reading 
Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997).  So that there is no mistake: my argument 
is designed only to establish what the Constitution says, not the extent (if any) to which anyone 
should care what the Constitution says. 
 9. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). 
 10. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (summarizing the conventional 
view). 
 11. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
23 (1994) [hereinafter Lawson, Case Against Precedent].  The article adapted a speech delivered 
at a Federalist Society conference on March 13, 1993. 
 12. Actually, to the best of my knowledge, the only sustained scholarly attempts to rebut 
the argument were offered by the conference panelists that I had specifically hand-picked to 
comment on the argument.  See Akhil Reed Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 39 (1994); Charles Fried, Reply to Lawson, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (1994); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45 (1994).  Otherwise, the argument seems to have acquired the status of an 
obligatory “but cf.” citation, to the effect of: “Yes, there is that nutty Lawson out there, but let’s 
get back to real business.”  A few hardy souls agree with me.  See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping 
Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289 (2005); John Tuskey, Do as We Say and Not (Necessarily) as We Do: The 
Constitution, Federalism, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Judicial Power, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 
153, 180–81 (2005).  Amy Coney Barrett has independently argued that, given the effect of 
precedent on non-parties, considerations of due process may place constitutional constraints on 
the application of precedent.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003). 
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(with apologies to Ford Prefect13) from “never” to “mostly never.”  It 
turns out to be a bit of an overstatement to claim that the Supreme 
Court should never rely on past decisions in preference to direct, 
unmediated examination of the Constitution.  But only a bit. 
In Part I of this Article, I will briefly recap the argument against 
precedent that I sketched in The Constitutional Case Against 
Precedent.14  Although my purpose here is to refine that argument, I 
still think that the original argument is right in most particulars, and 
it still functions as a prima facie case against the use of precedent in 
constitutional interpretation.  In Part II, I survey, hopefully more 
carefully than I did fifteen years ago, different possible grounds for 
the practice of precedent.  One might choose to follow precedent 
because some controlling legal authority requires it, because it is 
useful for determining the right answer, or because it is easier and 
cheaper than figuring out the right answer from scratch.  A full 
assessment of the constitutionality of precedent must independently 
consider each possible ground.  In Part III, I will quickly dismiss the 
possibility (which very few people actually advance) that the 
Constitution or some other controlling legal source affirmatively 
commands the use of precedent in constitutional cases.  In Part IV, 
which focuses on epistemological and consequentialist arguments for 
precedent, I argue that the Constitution only permits the use of 
precedent in constitutional cases in very limited circumstances.  A 
court may properly use precedent if, but only if, the precedent is the 
best available evidence of the right answer to constitutional questions.  
In order to be good evidence of the right answer, a precedent must be 
the product of an honest, skilled effort that poses the right questions 
and tries to solve them through the right methods.  It is theoretically 
possible that there could be some circumstances in which prior 
judicial decisions might qualify for weight under this standard, but it 
is inconceivable that those circumstances could hold for any 
significant subclass of judicial decisions, much less for judicial 
decisions as a class.  Indeed, the best categorical case for precedent 
involves judicial deference to certain executive or legislative 
judgments in limited circumstances, though the case for any such 
deference requires some very strong assumptions that will not always 
be justified. 
 
 13. See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 63 (1980). 
 14.  Lawson, The Case Against Precedent, supra note 11. 
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In sum, there is at best a very weak constitutional case for the 
doctrine of precedent, and it is at best a case for a very weak doctrine 
of precedent. 
I. REVISITING THE CASE AGAINST PRECEDENT 
The federal Constitution grants to the federal courts one and only 
one power: “[t]he judicial Power of the United States.”15  Federal 
courts have the capacity to receive power to appoint inferior officers if 
Congress chooses to grant it,16 and the chief justice personally has the 
power and duty to preside over presidential impeachment trials in the 
Senate,17 but the only power actually granted to the federal courts as 
an institution is the judicial power.  It is remarkably difficult to give a 
full account of the original meaning of the phrase “[t]he judicial 
Power,” but fortunately the dispute focuses on the periphery, rather 
than the core.  The central feature of the judicial power is clearly the 
power to decide cases according to governing law;18 the question that 
divides scholars is what ancillary powers go along with the basic 
power to decide cases.19 
In order to decide cases in accordance with governing law, one 
must know what law governs.  That inquiry requires interpretation of 
the relevant sources of law—which is why the power of law 
interpretation is a necessary concomitant of the judicial power, just as 
it is a necessary concomitant of the legislative and executive 
powers20—and also determination of which law governs in the case of 
conflict.  In any given case, many different legal norms from many 
different sources—including constitutions, statutes, treaties, 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 16. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 17. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 18. This is so clearly the core of the judicial power that it is difficult to find specific 
authority stating the obvious.  If authority is deemed obligatory, see 1 JAMES WILSON, Of 
Government, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 343, 363 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, 
Callaghan & Co. 1896) (“The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles 
of right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the 
manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested in them.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s 
Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001). 
 20. For a discussion of the parallels between the judicial and executive powers of law 
interpretation, see Lawson & Moore, supra note 3. 
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regulations, court decisions, traditional practices, and theories of 
justice—might potentially bear on the outcome.  Depending on the 
legal system in place, any or all of these norms might legitimately 
claim the status of “law,” and if they point in different directions, a 
court employing “[t]he judicial Power” must determine which sources 
take priority.  As Justice John Marshall succinctly put it in Marbury v. 
Madison, “[i]f two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each.”21  An essential, and inescapable, 
feature of the judicial power is the power and duty to resolve conflict-
of-laws problems. 
The federal Constitution contains only one express conflict-of-
laws provision, but it is a doozy.  The Supremacy Clause declares: 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.22 
This clause is a specific directive to prefer three named federal legal 
sources over any other legal sources, including state law sources, in 
the event of a conflict.  The clause singles out state court judges for 
emphasis, but the basic conflict rule expressed in the first part of the 
clause is not limited to state court judges.  By its terms, the Supremacy 
Clause speaks to all legal actors—federal and non-federal, judicial and 
non-judicial—and asserts the superiority of the Constitution, statutes, 
and treaties over competing sources of law.  The Supremacy Clause 
conspicuously does not include “decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court” when naming the sources of law at the top of the 
legal food chain. 
So, right away the Constitution itself establishes a prima facie case 
against the use of precedent: if a prior judicial decision conflicts with 
the Constitution, a statute, or a treaty, the prior decision must give 
way.  If even a state constitution cannot prevail over the federal 
Constitution, it is hard to see how the views of three to five 
(depending on the size of the Supreme Court) lawyers or hacks 
(depending on the composition of the Supreme Court) can do so. 
 
 21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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There is more.  Within the set of legal trumps spelled out by the 
Supremacy Clause, there is an internal hierarchy.  While the 
Supremacy Clause seems to place the Constitution, federal statutes, 
and treaties on the same legal plane, one can infer with a reasonable 
degree of confidence23 that the Constitution is the ace of trumps and 
prevails in conflicts with statutes and treaties.24  The inferential 
argument to this effect, based on a combination of the nature of 
written constitutions—the specific structure of the American 
Constitution, and the Oath Clauses25—is familiar from Marbury and 
will not be rehearsed here.26  Thus, if the Constitution conflicts with a 
statute or treaty (including a statute or treaty that purports to place 
some other legal source, such as precedent, above the Constitution), 
the Constitution takes the trick. 
To see how these principles work, consider a hypothetical statute 
that flagrantly conflicts with the Constitution.  The statute was 
enacted by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.  
According to the plain terms of the Constitution, the statute counts as 
a “Law.”27  If the statute applies to a particular dispute that comes 
 
 23. One can fairly ask whether a reasonable degree of confidence is enough.  And one can 
fairly—and indeed must—answer: enough for what?  The standard of proof that any 
proposition must meet depends to some extent on the purpose for which the proposition is 
advanced.  This is a huge subject that I have addressed at ghastly length elsewhere and note 
here only for completeness.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 
(1992); Gary Lawson, Proving Ownership, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 139 (1994); Gary Lawson, Legal 
Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996). 
 24. There is also a very good case that, contrary to current doctrine that applies a “last in 
time” rule, statutes must prevail over treaties in cases of conflict, but that is another topic.  For a 
characteristically elegant argument for the priority of federal statutes over treaties, see Vasan 
Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479 (2006). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he [the President] enter on the Execution of his 
Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’”); id. art. VI, cl. 3 
(“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State 
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”).  Both clauses 
single out the Constitution for special consideration. 
 26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–80 (1803).  It is presumably obvious 
that I am citing Marbury because I find its argument on this point persuasive, not because I 
think it is authoritative.  Indeed, I have elsewhere expressly rejected aspects of Marbury (such as 
its specific holding) where they are not persuasive.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The 
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to 
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing, contrary to Marbury, that 
Congress has power to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing the process by which a bill becomes a “Law”). 
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before a court, the court’s obligation to decide cases in accordance 
with governing law creates a prima facie obligation to apply the 
statute.  But, if the opposing side objects that the statute is 
unconstitutional, and the court agrees, the court is faced with a 
straightforward conflict between two competing sources of law.  The 
Supremacy Clause identifies the Constitution as law, but the 
Presentment Clause equally proclaims the statute to be law.  What is a 
judge to do? 
The Constitution, like Meredith Grey to Dr. McDreamy, says: 
“Choose me.”28  Because the Constitution is hierarchically superior to 
all other competing legal sources, the Constitution must prevail.  This 
does not mean that the statute is not law.  It is law by definition, and 
in any case in which it does not conflict with the Constitution, or in 
which the conflict is not brought before the court, the statute 
continues to operate.  Its unconstitutionality does not erase it from the 
pages of the United States Code.  But in any head-to-head battle with 
the Constitution in a specific case, the statute loses. 
Now suppose that a prior judicial decision speaks squarely to the 
resolution of a dispute brought before a court.  Let us assume that 
prior judicial decisions count as law of some sort, even though they 
do not have the specifically designated legal status of the 
Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.  That status as law creates 
a prima facie obligation on the part of the court to apply the decision.  
But as soon as the other side interposes the Constitution, the court is 
now faced with two competing sources of law.  If the Constitution 
says, “A,” and the prior judicial decision says, “B,” the Constitution 
must prevail.  If a statute, which the Constitution specifically declares 
to be “Law,” cannot defeat the Constitution, it is hard to see how a 
judicial decision could have a more exalted legal status. 
That, in a nutshell, is the short and (I think) elegantly simple case 
against the use of precedent in constitutional cases.  If I am permitted 
the conceit of self-quotation: 
 Thus, the case for judicial review of legislative or executive action 
is precisely coterminous with the case for judicial review of prior 
judicial action.  What’s sauce for the legislative or executive goose is 
 
 28. Grey’s Anatomy: Bring the Pain (ABC television broadcast Oct. 23, 2005). 
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also sauce for the judicial gander.  At least as a prima facie matter, 
the reasoning of Marbury thoroughly de-legitimizes precedent.29 
The question is whether anything can overcome that prima facie case. 
 
II. WHY PRECEDENT? 
The key to understanding the possible responses to this prima 
facie case against precedent is to recognize and keep clear (as I did not 
always do fifteen years ago)30 three distinct grounds on which one 
might give weight to the decision of a prior legal actor.  I have 
elsewhere labeled those grounds legal, epistemological, and 
economic.31  The labels are not necessarily the most descriptive that 
one might imagine, but I will stick with them for now. 
Legal deference involves giving weight to another actor’s decision 
because some controlling legal authority requires it.32  Consider, for 
example, the role of jury verdicts in federal court.  The Constitution 
contains provisions that specifically require subsequent decision 
makers to give a certain measure of respect to jury verdicts.  In the 
case of acquittals by criminal juries, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
makes the jury decision absolutely conclusive on subsequent decision 
makers.33   If a federal jury acquits a criminal defendant, the judge 
cannot alter the verdict and executive officials cannot lawfully confine 
the defendant.  Even if the judge, the lawyers, the Attorney General, 
and the President all believe—and even believe correctly—that the 
jury was incompetent, stupid, and biased and has blatantly 
 
 29. Lawson, Case Against Precedent, supra note 11, at 28. 
 30. The comments on my earlier article by Fried, see Fried, supra note 12, were especially 
helpful in prodding my further thoughts on the different varieties of precedent. 
 31. The distinction between legal and epistemological deference was articulated in Lawson 
& Moore, supra note 3, at 1271, 1278–79.  The concept of economic deference was added in 
Lawson, Everything I Need to Know, supra note 2, at 384, 386. 
 32. In previous work, I have used the term “legal deference” to describe status-based 
deference, in which prior decisions are given weight because of the position of the prior actor in 
the legal system.  Lawson, Everything I Need to Know, supra note 2, at 384–85.  I now want to 
use the term in a different sense to mean deference that is commanded by some authoritative 
legal source.  Normally, a command to defer to someone else will translate pretty directly into 
status-based deference (the “someone else” will almost always be identified by his or her 
position in the legal system), but strictly speaking that relationship is theoretically contingent. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb”). 
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disregarded the law, including the applicable law of the Constitution, 
the acquittal still stands.34  Acquittals by criminal juries are legally 
conclusive, not because of any case-specific determinations of the 
wisdom or competence of the particular jury in the case, but simply 
because the Constitution says that acquittals by criminal juries are 
legally conclusive. 
If the federal jury was sitting in a civil case, its verdict would not 
be conclusive, but would nonetheless be legally entitled to 
considerable weight by subsequent actors, such as a judge entering 
judgment in the case, by virtue of the Seventh Amendment.35  A judge 
cannot enter judgment contrary to a civil jury verdict simply because 
the judge thinks that the jury made a mistake, but can only enter 
judgment as a matter of law if the jury behaved unreasonably.  Again, 
this legal rule does not depend on particular facts about particular 
juries; a jury verdict is entitled to a measure of legal weight simply 
because the Constitution commands deference to jury verdicts.36  
Thus, one very good reason for giving precedential weight to a prior 
judicial decision would be that an authoritative legal source, such as 
the Constitution, commanded it. 
Epistemological deference, by contrast, results when one treats 
prior decisions as good evidence of the right answer.  If one starts 
with the idea of independently determining the right answer to a 
question, it is possible that, along the way, one might run across 
someone else who has already thought about the question carefully, 
was in a good position to get the right answer, and has relevant 
indicia of reliability.  The fact that this other actor has reached a 
 
 34. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in 
an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 48–49 (2003); Margaret H. Lemos, The 
Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption 
of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1229–31 (2006). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”).  In all likelihood, most of the substance of the Seventh Amendment 
was also part of the constitutional structure even before 1791, but that is a topic for another day.  
See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 (1999). 
 36. Other sources of law besides the Constitution also sometimes purport to command 
deference to precedent.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), for example, commands federal 
appellate courts to defer to (that is, attach precedential weight to) prior factual determinations 
by district judges by permitting rejection of those findings only when they are “clearly 
erroneous.”  For other examples of legal deference grounded in non-constitutional sources, see 
supra note 3. 
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particular conclusion might well constitute good evidence, and 
perhaps even the best available evidence, of the right answer.  Giving 
weight to that prior answer would simply be common sense, even in 
the absence of any legal command to do so.  Unlike legal deference, 
epistemological deference focuses on case-specific reasons for 
thinking that a particular actor is a good source of guidance, though 
one can imagine general rules that might flow from these case-specific 
judgments. 
Economic deference results from a cost-benefit analysis that 
suggests that giving weight to a prior decision is so much easier and 
cheaper (however “cheaper” is defined) than reconsidering the matter 
from scratch that deference to the prior decision is appropriate.  This 
model of precedent recognizes that prior decisions may or may not be 
very good evidence of the right answer, but holds that figuring out 
either the right answer or whether the prior decision is good evidence 
of the right answer may be too expensive to be worthwhile.  Such 
judgments can get very complicated; the “costs” of not having the 
right answer vary greatly with the context, as do the costs of 
determining right answers, the costs of determining the costs of right 
answers, and the comparative costs of figuring out the right answer 
and figuring out the answer that is supposedly prescribed by 
precedent.  Defenses of precedent that rely on the good consequences 
supposedly produced by the practice, such as predictability, stability, 
and objectivity, are forms of arguments for economic deference: they 
argue, in essence, that wrong answers are better than right answers 
when the social costs (however those are measured) of wrong 
answers are lower. 
The practice of precedent could, in principle, be justified by any or 
all of these grounds.  The precise shape of the doctrine obviously 
depends on the grounds by which it is justified. 
III. DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND  
RELIANCE ON PRECEDENT? 
Jury verdicts must operate as precedent (of varying weight 
depending on the context) because the Constitution says that they 
must.  If the Constitution similarly directs courts to give weight to 
prior judicial decisions, that would end the matter. 
With one modest but important exception (involving the finality 
of judgments) that does not bear on the limited topic of Supreme 
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Court adherence to Supreme Court precedent,37 the Constitution has 
no express clauses assigning weight to judicial decisions comparable 
to the provisions concerning juries.  The Constitution says only that 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”38  The idea has occasionally been 
floated that the “judicial Power” includes a general obligation to 
prefer judicial decisions to the Constitution in at least some cases,39 
but there is not much to support the claim. 
The judicial power is the power to decide cases according to 
governing law.  In the course of that task, courts must determine 
which law governs, which includes making conflict-of-laws 
judgments when multiple sources of law are brought into play.  But, 
textually and structurally, even if judicial decisions count as law in 
some contexts (as they surely do in common law adjudication), one 
would need something as explicit as the jury clauses, or as 
structurally clear as the principle of finality of judgments, to permit 
any other consideration to leapfrog the Constitution in the conflict-of-
laws hierarchy.40  The bare grant of the “judicial Power,” with its 
 
 37. In order for the “judicial Power” vested in the federal courts to be an actual power, it 
must have the capacity to bind other actors, including executive actors who are charged with 
enforcement of judgments.  As a result, judicial decisions have a constitutionally-based 
precedential effect of sorts as judgments in specific cases.  The precise contours of this finality-
based doctrine of precedent are a topic for another time (as the contours were fifteen years ago, 
see Lawson, Case Against Precedent, supra note 11, at 30 & n.22), as they primarily implicate 
issues of vertical or interdepartmental precedent that are beyond the scope of this Article.  For a 
preliminary exploration, see Lawson & Moore, supra note 3, at 1313–26. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 39. A panel of the Eighth Circuit advanced a position with these implications some years 
ago, holding that courts could not refuse to give precedential weight to unpublished opinions, 
see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899–903 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 
1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), but the argument was very thin and has not been well received.  
See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 
(2001).  A few academics have suggested that the obligation to follow precedent might be part 
and parcel of the Article III “judicial Power,” but those arguments are also very thin.  See, e.g., 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577 (2001); Monaghan, supra note 7, at 754.  The fullest 
argument that Article III incorporates some theory of precedent relies largely on history.  See 
Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and 
the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006).  But while the concept of precedent was certainly 
familiar to the Founding generation, see id. at 462–67, there was no tradition of precedent in the 
face of an express Supremacy Clause that declared the hierarchical superiority of certain sources 
of law. 
 40. Even the finality of judgments principle generates at most a presumption in favor of 
enforcement.  If the President is genuinely convinced, with a high degree of confidence, that the 
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accompanying inference of the power of judicial review, no more 
requires courts to prefer their prior legal conclusions to the 
Constitution than the grant of the “executive Power,” with its 
accompanying inference of the power of executive review, requires 
the President to prefer his or her prior legal conclusions to the 
Constitution.  And if one wishes to resort to history, the doctrine of 
precedent was certainly familiar in the Founding era, but not so well 
established and developed to be a part of the “judicial Power” in the 
super-strong sense that would be necessary to give judicial decisions 
preference over the Constitution.41  In sum, there is little to be said for 
a general constitutional obligation to follow precedent, and little is in 
fact said about it. 
IV.  DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT RELIANCE ON PRECEDENT? 
Very few people seriously maintain that courts are 
constitutionally required to follow precedent.  The standard account 
of precedent holds that it is a policy rather than a legal command 
(though that position has implications that many of its adherents have 
not yet recognized42).  Accordingly, my earlier argument in The 
Constitutional Case Against Precedent did not contend merely that 
the Constitution does not require courts to follow precedent, but 
contended that the Constitution affirmatively forbids reliance on 
precedent in constitutional cases—where “reliance on precedent” is 
understood as treating precedent as something that can, in principle, 
change the outcome that would be reached by unmediated 
interpretation of the Constitution.43  That argument requires some 
modest revisions, which I provide here. 
 
judgment reflects constitutional error, the President should not enforce the judgment.  See 
Lawson & Moore, supra note 3, at 1325–26. 
 41. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the 
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999). 
 42. For an exploration of some of these consequences, which include requiring the Court to 
overrule precedent when the political branches express strong disagreement with the decision, 
see Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative 
Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 311, 314, 335–48 (2005). 
 43.  See generally Lawson, The Case Against Precedent, supra note 11. 
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A. The Case Against Permissive Legal Deference 
The prima facie case against requiring adherence to precedent also 
functions as a prima facie case against permitting adherence to 
precedent.  Courts have an obligation to decide cases in accordance 
with governing law.  Once it is acknowledged that the Constitution is 
supreme law, and thus is always the governing law when it applies, a 
court would fail to exercise the “judicial Power” properly if it decided 
a case in accordance with some other source of law that conflicted 
with the Constitution.  For the same reasons that Article III does not 
require courts to follow precedent (and Article II does not require 
Presidents to follow precedent), Article III does not authorize courts 
to follow precedent (and Article II does not authorize Presidents to 
follow precedent).  The conflict-of-laws rule stated in the Supremacy 
Clause and implicit in the entire constitutional structure is 
incorporated into Article III’s grant of the “judicial Power” and is not 
altered or superseded by that grant.44  The power to apply governing 
law ordinarily also carries with it the power to determine which law 
governs, but not when the Constitution has already made that 
decision. 
Frederick Schauer has responded that my argument depends 
upon the Constitution containing its own rules of interpretation, 
which he considers a logical impossibility.45  If the “meaning” of the 
Constitution is in fact what judges say it is, or what most actors in the 
legal system think it is, then there is a very good case that the 
“meaning” of Article III (or some other aspect of the Constitution) is 
that precedent may, on some nontrivial set of occasions, rule the day.  
Indeed, if practice determines constitutional meaning, my argument is 
obviously frivolous. 
Schauer is partly right, but not in a way that saves precedent.  
One does, of course, need to bring extraconstitutional 
interpretative norms to bear in reading the Constitution, just as 
one must bring extra-Schauerian norms to bear in reading Schauer.  
 
 44. Hence, Peter J. Smith is simply wrong when he says, in a quite conclusory fashion, that 
Article III “can reasonably be read to authorize reliance on precedent in constitutional 
adjudication.”  Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 612, 636 (2006).  Smith’s only support for his claim about the meaning of the judicial power, 
see id. at 636 n.104, is an argument by Fallon that expressly does not employ anything remotely 
resembling originalist analysis (as originalism is understood by all of its prominent modern 
practitioners).  See Fallon, supra note 39, at 577–81. 
 45. Schauer, supra note 12, at 54–55. 
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But those extraconstitutional (and extra-Schauerian) norms are 
objectively discoverable, and they do not involve the ipse dixit of 
judges, lawyers, or any other concrete historical individuals.  The 
Constitution means what a hypothetical reasonable observer at the 
time of its ratification, in possession of all relevant information, would 
have understood it to mean.  This conclusion about constitutional 
meaning flows from reflection on background principles of human 
communication, the kind of document that one is interpreting (an 
instruction manual for a particular governmental structure), the 
character of jointly authored products, and the specific instructions 
for interpretation contained in the document (which one can readily 
understand through the application of the extraconstitutional norms 
that I have just described).46  When the Constitution is interpreted the 
same way that any normal person would interpret an eighteenth-
century manual for constructing a compost heap, it follows that 
Article III does not authorize courts to prefer precedent, or anything 
else, to the Constitution in cases of conflict.47 
But might not Article III at least authorize courts to look to 
precedent to determine whether there is a conflict between precedent 
and the Constitution?  My argument, after all, centers on conflict-of-
laws principles.  How does one tell, in any given case, whether the 
claims of precedent and the claims of the Constitution are in fact in 
conflict? 
A full answer to this conundrum would require a general theory 
of interpretation, but it is enough for now to point out several 
considerations that require direct examination of the Constitution in 
order to determine its meaning.  First, both the Preamble and the 
Supremacy Clause refer to “this Constitution.”  The Constitution self-
referentially describes itself as the object to be construed.  Second, 
Article III does not specifically grant to courts an interpretative power 
 
 46. On background norms of communication, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s 
Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529 (1998).  On everything else, see Vasan Kesavan 
& Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 
91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48 (2003); Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, supra note 
8; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 
(2006). 
 47. I would have to have a long conversation with Schauer about this to be certain, but I 
suspect that he is much more interested in the Constitution’s authority than he is in the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  From the standpoint of authority, it is entirely possible that 
precedent in some form will play a major role.  But I am not making any claims about the 
Constitution’s authority.  I am simply describing its meaning. 
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superior to, or different from, the interpretative power vested in the 
President or Congress, or residually possessed by state officials.  
Indeed, the Constitution does not expressly grant interpretative 
power to anyone; all powers of interpretation in the Constitution arise 
by inference.  The Constitution pretty clearly assumes that it has a 
meaning independent of the act of interpretation, and it does not 
charge any particular actor with either the creation or discovery of 
that meaning.  The bottom line of all of these considerations (and 
many others) is that it would make no sense to construe Article III (or, 
for that matter, Article II) to make the meaning of the Constitution for 
conflict-of-laws purposes dependent on the act of interpretation of the 
actor charged with determining whether its actions conflict with the 
Constitution.  The Constitution means what it means.  Precedents 
mean what they mean.  If they conflict, the Constitution itself says to 
prefer the Constitution. 
B. The Case Against Permissive Economic Deference 
At the risk of grossly over-generalizing about a voluminous body 
of scholarship, I suspect that most advocates of precedent ground 
their position not in some construction of Article III, but in the 
practical consequences that result from reliance on precedent.  After 
all, if one is not arguing that the Constitution requires adherence to 
precedent as a legal rule, but merely that the Constitution permits 
adherence to precedent as a legal policy, it is natural to look at the 
justifications for that policy.48 
Fifteen years ago, I brushed aside those kinds of arguments as 
unworthy of serious consideration in a study of original meaning: 
 The class of pro-precedent arguments that does not deserve 
careful attention involves the claim that following precedent serves 
important prudential interests, such as stability, predictability, 
judicial economy, fairness, and legitimacy.  Even if the practice of 
following precedent in fact promotes these interests, that would at 
most establish that a well-crafted constitution would permit, or 
require, courts to follow precedent.  I have no strong view, and do 
not mean to imply one here, on how a well-crafted constitution 
 
 48. For a few random examples of consequentialist arguments for precedent, see Daniel A. 
Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006); Earl Maltz, 
The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368–72 (1988); Smith, supra note 44, at 636–37. 
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should handle precedent.  My present concern is with the actual 
Constitution, however well- or ill-crafted it may be, and arguments 
from prudence go nowhere unless they are tied to the interpretation 
of some provision of the constitutional text.49 
I would say essentially the same thing today.  There may very well be 
plenty of statutes and executive actions that are flatly inconsistent 
with the Constitution but which are normatively superior to the 
Constitution.  Their normative superiority does not make them 
constitutional.  Similarly, the practice of following precedent may 
well be, in many circumstances, a nice idea.  But the Constitution does 
not contain a “Nice Idea” clause. 
In the end, my disagreement with “pragmatists” who defend 
precedent on consequentialist grounds most likely results from the 
fact that we are asking different questions.  I am asking what the 
Constitution means.  They are (I believe) asking how courts should 
decide cases.  Those two sets of questions are only contingently 
related and require application of very different disciplines.  
Questions about the Constitution’s meaning are the province of legal 
interpretation.  Questions about how courts should decide cases are 
the province of moral and political theory.  It is entirely possible that 
modern American legal actors should, as a matter of political 
morality, make decisions without reference to the meaning of the 
Constitution.  As an empirical matter, that is essentially what happens 
most of the time.  If that is what pragmatic arguments for precedent 
are saying, I have no comment on them (other than the perhaps 
tendentious suggestion that legal scholars, even very smart legal 
scholars, are unlikely to have much of anything useful to say about 
political morality).50 
The same distinction between questions of interpretation and 
questions of governance surely also underlies my disagreement with 
most of my fellow originalists on this score.  As Justice Antonin Scalia 
aptly put it, “almost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] 
with the doctrine of stare decisis,”51 because “most originalists are 
 
 49. Lawson, Case Against Precedent, supra note 11, at 28–29 (footnotes omitted). 
 50. For an argument that more directly addresses the consequences of following precedent, 
see Paulsen, supra note 12.  And for a straightforward consequentialist argument for 
abandoning precedent in constitutional cases, see William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court 
and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of 
Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 92–106. 
 51. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). 
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faint-hearted.”52  That is, strict adherence to originalism—which 
Justice Scalia acknowledges is incompatible with stare decisis—would 
generate consequences that most originalists regard as unacceptable.  
For example, it is relatively easy to demonstrate that federal laws 
requiring the public acceptance of fiat currency as payment for debts 
are unconstitutional, but, as Judge Bork put it with characteristic 
elegance: “[I]f a judge today were to decide that paper money is 
unconstitutional, we would think he ought to be accompanied not by 
a law clerk but by a guardian.”53  These are not arguments about the 
meaning of the Constitution; they are arguments about when the 
meaning of the Constitution should, in real-world decision making, 
give way to something else.  Resolution of the latter argument is the 
province of moral and political theory, and I am not a moral and 
political theorist.  Indeed, I am barely a lawyer.54 
C. The Case Against—Well, Mostly Against—Epistemological 
Deference 
In everyday life, we frequently rely on the views of others.  
Sometimes, we do so for reasons of convenience (economic 
deference).  Other times, we do so because we recognize, or at least 
believe, that others know more than we do.  When physicists tell me 
that gravity is not a force exerted by one object upon another, but 
rather is the result of the warping of the space-time continuum by 
mass,55 I take their word for it.  I assume that they could prove their 
claim if I spent enough years learning the mathematics necessary to 
understand their arguments, and it is very hard for me to see how it 
would be in their interests to deceive me.  I am willing to accept their 
prior decisions on the question of the nature of gravity as precedent.  
May courts, consistently with the Constitution, similarly rely on prior 
decisions when there is good reason to view those prior decisions as 
reliable? 
The answer is that of course they may.  The primary obligation of 
a court exercising the judicial power is to decide cases in accordance 
 
 52. Id. at 862. 
 53. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
155 (1990). 
 54. J.D. 1983, Yale Law(?) School. 
 55. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 15–35 (updated and expanded 10th anniv. 
ed. 1998). 
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with governing law.  That task requires discerning the content of the 
governing law.  When the law in question is the Constitution, the 
proper way to discern its meaning is to ask how the relevant 
provisions, in context, would have been understood by a hypothetical 
reasonable observer at the time of their ratification.  If someone else 
has already made that inquiry, and this someone else likely knows 
more about the subject than the judge in question, and there is good 
reason to think that this someone else applied the correct 
methodology honestly, and there is no good reason to think that this 
someone else would have cause to skew the result, then it makes 
perfectly good sense to defer to this someone else.  If that is all that 
precedent involved, there would be a perfectly sensible constitutional 
case for it: judges have the obligation to get the right answer, and if 
the best evidence of the right answer is what someone else has 
already come up with, then go with it.56 
Precedent of this sort, however, is highly dependent on a wide 
range of conditions that frequently are not satisfied.  For starters, it 
requires that the previous decision maker be better situated to get the 
right answer than the present decision maker.  If the previous 
decision maker was none too bright, an obligation to get the right 
answer would counsel strongly against giving that person’s 
conclusions much, if any, weight.  In addition, even the smartest 
person may not be a reliable guide if he or she is using the wrong 
method.  Brilliant people asking the wrong questions are unlikely to 
get the right answers.  Thus, for example, even though Justice Stephen 
Breyer is one of the smartest people ever to walk the planet, it would 
be foolhardy to rely on prior conclusions that he has reached about 
constitutional meaning because he is not actually looking for original 
constitutional meaning.  Finally, even very smart people applying a 
correct method may be unreliable if they have motives to reach a 
particular result, and if there is reason to suspect that they have, 
consciously or not, yielded to those motives.  In order to justify giving 
weight to a prior decision, many indicia of reliability have to align. 
The chances of such an alignment in the modern world roughly 
approximate the chances of my beloved Seattle Mariners, Seattle 
Seahawks, and (at least as of 2006) Seattle Supersonics all winning a 
 
 56. See Lawson, Case Against Precedent, supra note 11, at 25 (“Courts are free to give 
weight, and even decisive weight, to prior decisions because of the persuasiveness of their 
reasoning—just as they may give weight, and even decisive weight, to persuasive arguments in 
briefs, law review articles, or newspaper columns.”). 
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world championship in the same season.  Even if one goes back to 
earlier times—times without Justices Earl Warren and Harry 
Blackmun or Ivy League law clerks eager to get their (and their 
professors’) elitist liberal prejudices enshrined in the United States 
Reports—there was never a golden age in which courts faithfully 
sought the original meaning of the Constitution through 
dispassionate application of a sound methodology.  If one were 
interested in the original meaning of the Constitution, one would not 
first turn to the collected works of the United States Supreme Court. 
It is possible, however, that there are specific instances in which 
prior judicial actors carefully and honestly applied sound 
methodologies, and if one can pinpoint those instances, the 
conclusions reached in those cases would be entitled to some weight 
in the search for the right constitutional answers.  If precedent is 
being used for epistemological reasons as good evidence of the right 
answer, and if all of the conditions for believing specific precedents to 
qualify as such evidence are met, the Constitution permits its use.  
This is a very thin doctrine of precedent, but it is a doctrine of 
precedent nonetheless, and I hereby endorse it. 
This account of precedent generates some very loose guidelines 
for the use of prior decisions—some of which do, and some of which 
do not, cohere with widely held assumptions about precedent.  It 
suggests, for instance, that precedents closer to the Founding period 
might be more reliable than modern precedents if one believes that 
decision makers at the time of the Founding were better barometers 
than are modern legal actors of what a hypothetical reasonable 
observer would have thought during the Founding era.  This effect, of 
course, may be utterly swamped if Founding-era actors did not apply 
the correct methodology and/or had reasons to skew their results—
which was often the case.  It also suggests that not all decisions are 
created equal, because not all authors are created equal.  It is a 
profound mistake in principle to give epistemological deference to all 
Supreme Court decisions without regard to how they were produced 
and who produced them.  If an opinion is focused not on discovering 
original meaning, but on parsing past precedents, which themselves 
were not focused on discovering original meaning, the opinion is 
worthless as an interpretative guide, regardless of who authored it.  
Nor is authorship always irrelevant; conclusions reached by Justice 
Clarence Thomas are not epistemologically interchangeable with 
conclusions reached by Justice William J. Brennan.  Finally, this 
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account of epistemological precedent also suggests that legislative 
and executive precedents can be as or more valuable than judicial 
precedents.  Again, it all depends on whether there is good reason to 
think that capable people were faithfully applying a correct 
methodology.  If one is looking for evidence of original meaning, the 
work product of the Meese Justice Department57 is probably a better 
source than the work product of the Warren Court. 
Thus, if all of the epistemological stars align properly—and one 
suspects that this would be a relatively rare event—there is some 
constitutional warrant for giving weight to prior decisions.  Indeed, if 
the alignment is proper, there can be an actual constitutional 
obligation to give weight to prior decisions.  Given the constitutional 
obligation to discover and apply governing law, a judge who knows 
that he or she is not as well situated as someone else to find the right 
answer might well be required to defer to the proper decision maker 
if that decision maker’s prior conclusion is likely to be more reliable 
than the judge’s best efforts independently to get the right answer.  
And, if there are certain situations where other actors will 
categorically be better situated than the judge to find the right answer, 
epistemological deference can shade into a form of status-based legal 
deference: the judge will be obliged to go with the best possible view, 
which may require deference to someone because of his or her 
position in the legal hierarchy. 
It is, hopefully, obvious that the Supreme Court does not remotely 
fill this role.  If the Court over time consisted primarily of very smart 
people faithfully and dispassionately applying a methodology of 
original meaning without undue reliance on precedent, there might 
be the makings of some modest case for a general presumption of 
 
 57. The Meese Justice Department was hardly a paragon of originalist consistency, but at 
least it tried on a few occasions.  Prominent originalist scholars who worked, at one time or 
another, in the Meese Justice Department include (in no particular order) Steven G. Calabresi, 
John Harrison, Mike Rappaport, John McGinnis, and yours truly.  The fundamental and 
decidedly sound originalist idea that each department of the national government has an 
independent obligation to interpret the Constitution was (re)introduced to the American legal 
scene by Attorney General Meese, see Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 979 (1987), inspired in large measure by Calabresi, then-Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General.  The Office of Legal Policy in the Meese Justice Department produced a string of 
originalist analyses (which were not always correct) of such topics as the Ninth Amendment and 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A 
SOURCEBOOK (1987). 
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epistemological deference.  As they used to say on Saturday Night 
Live: “Not!”58  It is relatively rare that the justices even look for the 
Constitution’s original meaning, much less look for it correctly.  There 
is accordingly no plausible case for granting precedential weight to 
Supreme Court decisions as a class.  One might be able to single out 
certain decisions as deserving of precedential weight, though it is 
probably easier just to figure out every right answer from scratch than 
to hone down the universe of opinions to those few that might make 
the cut. 
Though it is incidental to this analysis, which is focused on the 
precedential status of Supreme Court decisions, there may be limited 
contexts in which legislative or executive actors might categorically be 
better situated than judges to reach sound constitutional conclusions, 
and in which legislative or executive decisions might thereby deserve 
weight as precedent.  In another article, I explore one such possible 
context: Presidents may categorically be in a better position to judge 
whether measures taken during wartime or other emergencies satisfy 
constitutional requirements.59  This kind of argument is very 
treacherous, as it requires an assessment of the institutional 
limitations of judges, along with some heroic assumptions about the 
competence, motives, and methodological predilections of the 
relevant executive department actors, but one can at least imagine 
circumstances in which such an argument would work. 
In the end, it is not strictly impossible to construct a narrowly 
tailored argument for affording weight to some especially reliable 
precedents in constitutional cases, but it is very, very difficult.  
Certainly there is no constitutional warrant for the broad-based 
deference currently afforded to past decisions by the Supreme Court 
simply because they are past decisions of the Supreme Court.  The 
Constitution does not allow itself to be overridden quite so easily.  
Thus, the constitutional case against precedent is not absolute.  But it 
is mostly absolute. 
 
 
 58. See, e.g., Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast Feb. 17, 1990); Saturday Night 
Live (NBC television broadcast May 19, 1990). 
 59. See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times 
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
